


Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505



LIA 4-2

27 February 1984

27 FEB 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Raymond F. Smith
Office of Soviet Affairs
Department of State
Room 4219

SUBJECT: State Department Report on Applying the Principles of
Equivalence and Reciprocity to the Soviet and Soviet
Bloc Representation in the U.S.

REFERENCE: State Memo of 17 February 1984, Subject As Above

In response to the request contained in reference, CIA forwards the following comments:

The draft report is not very responsive to the President's desire to do something about the hostile presence in the U.S. The thrust of the report is essentially negative with much greater emphasis on the "cons" than the "pros" of any suggested action except those that do not directly affect State; viz., increasing the CI capabilities of the FBI and increased funding for technical measures to counter the hostile intelligence threat.

The draft report does not address other less provocative actions such as modifying existing travel control procedures to require notification (as opposed to approval) of travel by Soviet personnel assigned to the UN Secretariat other than on official UN business, which we do not believe would come close to violating the Headquarters Agreement, and against which the USSR could not retaliate reciprocally. Another idea might be notification of any travel beyond say, 100 miles from city of assignment in the case of Soviet Bloc personnel, which if reciprocally applied would cause us slight harm. Other possibilities can be imagined which will aid our counter-intelligence effort without necessarily creating a "high noon" situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc over this issue.

A minor but not insignificant problem with the report is its use of statistics that are potentially misleading. Figures for the U.S. presence in the Soviet Union, for example, include two categories of personnel that are extraneous to the issue; namely, local and third country hire personnel and TDY personnel. In the case of the latter, these are predominantly construction personnel. When these two groups are subtracted from the total, the imbalance in favor of the Soviets is much greater.





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CIA agrees that it would be imprudent to take the risk to our collection capabilities in the Bloc by reducing the number of assigned personnel in diplomatic and/or consular facilities, in spite of the favorable French, British, Belgian and Canadian experience. But we have been directed by our President to recommend prudent steps to assist the FBI's counterintelligence efforts against the Soviet Bloc presence, which the State draft simply fails to do.

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Executive SecretaryTBC:kac (27 Feb 84 -- 

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